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Abstract  
Since 2005, 23 states have passed Stand Your Ground (SYG) laws: allowing a person to use 
deadly force in self-defense, even in situations where one can safely flee from an assailant. 
This study investigates whether SYG laws increased the demand for firearms by using 
data on background checks for firearms purchases as a proxy for the demand for legal 
firearms. Results from three alternative difference in differences estimates provide 
evidence that the passage of SYG laws generally led to an increase in the demand for legal 
firearms.  
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1 Introduction 
America is a country founded on guns. It's in our DNA. It's very strange 
but I feel better having a gun. I really do. I don't feel safe, I don't feel the 
house is completely safe, if I don't have one hidden somewhere. That's my 
thinking, right or wrong. 
- Brad Pitt 
The shooting of Trayvon Martin on February 26, 2012 sparked a public debate over 
Stand Your Ground (SYG) laws.1 While the media has focused on several high profile 
cases involving SYG, academic research on the broader effects of SYG has been limited. 
This paper adds to the small body of empirical literature on SYG laws by investigating 
the economic consequences of SYG. Specifically, this study estimates the effect of SYG on 
the demand for firearms. 
Under the traditional rule of self-defense, a person may only use deadly force as a 
last resort: a situation where a person cannot safely flee from an aggressor. An exception 
to this rule exists within the confines of one’s home. The Castle Doctrine permits a person 
to use deadly force against a home intruder, regardless of whether such force is necessary 
(Dressler, 2006). SYG laws expand the Castle Doctrine outside the home: allowing a 
defender to use deadly force against an aggressor in any place he or she has a legal right 
to be, even in cases when a defender believes he or she can reasonably flee from an 
1 For example, see the following articles Shot to Death in Florida (New York Times), Florida's Disastrous 
Self-Defense Law (New York Times), Trayvon Martin's Death Puts Florida's 'Stand Your Ground' Law 
Under New Scrutiny (ABC), The political battle over ‘Stand Your Ground’ laws (The Washington Post), 
Florida shooting renews debate over 'stand your ground' laws (CNN). 
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assailant. Following the passage of Florida’s SYG law in 2005, 21 states have enacted 
similar legislation.2 
Why study SYG laws and the demand for firearms? As exemplified in the epigraph, 
Americans love guns. Americans own between 262 and 310 million firearms—nearly one 
gun per capita (Hill, 2013). Civilians in the U.S. own more guns per capita than civilians 
in any other country (Small Arms Survey, 2011). In addition, guns are a highly 
contentious political issue.3 One factor that influences gun ownership in the US is the 
political environment. For example, one recent study finds that the election of President 
Obama led to a surge in the demand for firearms (Depetris-Chauvin, 2014). This paper 
investigates whether SYG laws led to a greater demand for firearms. This is important 
because an increase in gun ownership has societal implications—which can be positive 
or negative depending on one’s views. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the legal 
framework for SYG laws, as well as previous empirical research on SYG and the demand 
for firearms. Section 3 describes the data used in this study. Section 4 discusses the 
methods used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents and discusses results. Section 
6 concludes the paper.  
2 Interestingly, Utah passed its SYG law in 1994 and is the only state to enact a SYG law prior to Florida. 
3 In 2013, two Colorado legislators were recalled for supporting stricter gun control legislation. Specifically, 
they sought to ban magazines with over fifteen rounds of ammunition, and advocated for a universal 
background check, and a requirement that buyers pay a fee for each background check. 
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2 Background 
2.1 Overview of SYG laws  
The traditional rules of self-defense 
When may deadly force be used in self-defense? Under the “traditional rule of self-
defense”(Green, 1999) a non-aggressor is justified in using deadly force if he “reasonably 
believes such force is necessary to protect himself from imminent use of unlawful force 
by the other person”(Dressler, 2006). The justified use of deadly force requires the 
presence of three elements: 1) necessity; 2) proportionality; and 3) reasonable belief.  
Necessity restricts the use of deadly force to a means of last resort where deadly force 
may only be used “to the extent that it is necessary.” Dressler (2006) illustrates necessity 
with the following hypothetical: “[I]f V, an elderly or infirm aggressor, attempts to stab 
D, D may not kill V if D knows or should know that he could avoid death by disarming 
V, or by using non-deadly force.” Within the principle of necessity lies the duty to retreat. 
If a person believes he can safely flee from an aggressor, he may not respond using deadly 
force. Returning to Dressler’s example, D may not shoot V if D believes that he can safely 
retreat from his attacker. 
Proportionality prohibits a defender from using “excessive [force] in relation to the 
harm threatened [by the aggressor]” (Dressler, 2006). In adherence to this principle, a 
person may respond to a deadly threat using either lethal or non-lethal force. However, 
a person may not respond to a non-deadly threat using lethal force. Dressler illustrates 
proportionality with the following hypothetical: “[I]f V threatens to strike D on a public 
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road, and the only way D can avoid the battery is to push V into the street in front of a 
fast-moving car, D must abstain and seek compensation for the battery after the fact” 
(Dressler, 2006). 
The reasonable belief component requires that a person hold, “a reasonable (even if 
incorrect) belief that the use of force is necessary and proportional to the supposed threat” 
(Dressler, 2006). This requirement consists of two prongs: 1) a person must truly believe 
that deadly force is necessary and proportional to counter or respond to an imminent and 
unlawful threat; 2) a reasonable person would possess a similar belief to the defender 
under the same circumstances. 
The Castle Doctrine 
Returning to the element of necessity, the Castle Doctrine provides an exception to the 
duty to retreat. The Castle Doctrine is a universally recognized principle that eliminates 
a non-aggressor’s duty to retreat before using deadly force while defending his home—
even if he believes he can safely flee the premises. For example, if one encounters an 
unarmed robber inside his home, such a person may use deadly force against the 
intruder, even if the resident does not believe the intruder poses a threat to his life. 
Dressler (2006) cites two rationales for the Castle Doctrine. First, the home is like a 
castle. It provides shelter to those who reside within its walls. A person should not be 
forced to retreat further than his home, “for where shall a man be safe if it be not in his 
house?” Second, the home is a source of privacy, which creates an element of sanctity. 
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According to Dressler, “[w]hen a wrongdoer seeks to enter a person’s dwelling . . . more 
than property is invaded.” 
Stand Your Ground laws 
SYG laws further expand the traditional rule of self-defense. They remove the duty 
to retreat from any place a person has a legal right to be, and have been described as 
expansions to the Castle Doctrine.4 These laws turn the traditional rules of self-defense 
on its head; “they expand the [Castle Doctrine] to apply everywhere making it the rule 
instead of the exception” (Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2013). 
For example, SYG laws prevent law enforcement from arresting shooters who claim 
self-defense, unless they have probable cause that the shooter used unlawful force. 
Consequently, officials who improperly detain persons who claim self-defense may face 
wrongful arrest lawsuits. Many SYG laws further protect shooters with provisions that 
prevent criminal or civil cases from proceeding without first holding an immunity hearing. 
During a pretrial immunity hearing, both sides present evidence to a judge who 
determines whether the shooter’s actions were protected under the self-defense law (i.e., 
did the shooter act in self-defense?). If the judge rules in favor of the shooter, no criminal 
or civil trial can proceed. Otherwise, the case proceeds to trial.5 
4 The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) titled its model SYG law the Castle Doctrine Act, and 
this model served as the template for many states’ SYG laws.  
5 George Zimmerman waived his right to a pre-trial immunity hearing, but the jury was instructed to 
consider Florida’s SYG law, which they found applicable to Zimmerman. 
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A number of states also protect shooters who claim self-defense from civil suits. 
Eleven states provide blanket immunity from any form of civil litigation (Mayors Against 
Illegal Guns, 2013). These states bar anyone from bringing a civil suit against a person 
who uses deadly force in self-defense—including injured bystanders and their 
dependents. Other states offer partial immunity for persons who invoke SYG laws, 
barring only an aggressor or his relations from filing a civil action. In these states, civil 
suits can still be filed on behalf of injured bystanders and their families. 
Since Florida passed its SYG law in 2005, 22 states have passed similar SYG laws. 
Table 1 provides a list of these states, as well as the effective dates of their SYG laws. A 
majority of these states enacted their SYG laws over a two year period, between 2005 and 
2007. Figure 1 illustrates how the number of states with SYG laws sharply increased 
between 2005 and 2013. The National Rifle Association (NRA) and the American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) are two organizations that lobbied state 
legislatures to adopt SYG laws. Nugent-Borakove (2007) provide the following theories 
about what prompted Florida to adopt its SYG law: 
• Events like 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina diminished beliefs in public safety. 
Residents may have sought additional protections for use of deadly force in self-
defense following a future disaster. 
• Many people developed a lack of confidence in the criminal justice system after a 
number of high profile cases highlighted the vulnerability of some victims of 
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domestic violence. They believed that would-be victims of domestic violence, or 
similar crimes, need to acquire weapons to defend themselves should the need 
arise. 
• Over the past decade the political environment has shifted in favor of a loosening 
of gun restrictions. Particularly, the federal ban on assault rifles expired in 2004, 
and the Supreme Court ruled a ban on handguns unconstitutional in 2008.  
While some state laws expand the Castle Doctrine outside the home, not all SYG 
states extend the Castle Doctrine to any place a person has a legal right to be. Partial SYG 
laws remove the duty to retreat from a person’s vehicle or place of work. Table 2 provides 
a list of partial SYG states, as well as the effective dates of these laws.6 For this analysis, I 
focus on full SYG states, which have expanded the Castle Doctrine to any place a person 
has a legal right to be. I do not consider provisions regarding criminal or civil immunity 
in this definition. 
Proponents of SYG 
Proponents assert that self-defense is “a fundamental human right” (NRA, 2013). 
People who use deadly force in self-defense should not worry about facing criminal or 
6 In addition, several states have expanded the Castle Doctrine through case law, but not through 
legislation. For example, in the state of Washington there is no duty to retreat where any person has the 
legal right to be. See, State v. Redmond, 150 Wn.2d 489 (2003) “there is no duty to retreat when a person is 
assaulted in a place where he or she has a right to be.” 
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civil charges. Representative Dennis K. Baxley sponsored Florida’s SYG law in 2005, and 
offers the following anecdote about why SYG laws are necessary: 
The catalytic event that led to the legislation’s passage . . . was the looting of 
property in the aftermath of hurricanes. Specifically, there was a situation…where 
a citizen moved an RV onto his property, to protect the remains of his home from 
being looted. One evening, a perpetrator broke into the RV and attacked the 
property owner. The property owner, acting in self defense in his home, shot and 
killed the perpetrator. It was months before he knew whether he would be charged 
with a crime because there was no clear legal definition of self defense in such a 
case or of when a potential victim was required to retreat (Baxley, 2012). 
Along these same lines, John Lott argues that SYG laws benefit those who live in 
high-crime urban areas, where police cannot always respond in time to protect victims 
(John R. Lott, 2013). SYG laws make it easier for would-be victims to protect themselves 
under these scenarios, especially in situations where retreating could be dangerous.  
Critics of SYG 
Critics argue that “shoot first” laws lower the costs of using deadly force, which can 
lead to violent outcomes in situations “that just as easily might have ended with someone 
walking away” (Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, 2013). Many of these critics argue 
for the repeal of SYG laws. The Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (2012) has raised 
concerns that SYG laws: “may inhibit the ability of law enforcement and prosecutors to 
hold violent criminals accountable; may encourage vigilante behavior; and, in some 
circumstances, may put law enforcement lives at greater risk.” The Law Center to Prevent 
Gun Violence (2013) echoes these concerns: “[s]hoot first laws encourage people to take 
the law into their own hands and act as armed vigilantes, often with deadly 
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consequences.” They further argue that SYG laws become exponentially more dangerous 
when paired with concealed carry laws—laws that allow a person to carry a hidden, 
loaded handgun in public places.  
Critics also assert that SYG laws are “irrefutable” (Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 
2013). If the victim is dead, authorities must accept a shooter’s claim at face value in cases 
lacking witnesses or recordings. This is especially problematic in states that prevent law 
enforcement from arresting a shooter unless they have probable cause to believe that the 
shooter used unlawful force. 
2.2 Prior research on Stand Your Ground 
While the media has debated the merits of Stand Your Ground laws, academic 
research is limited to a handful of studies. Two studies focus on the effect of SYG laws on 
crime rates. Cheng and Hoekstra (2012) investigate the impact of SYG laws on crime rates 
in all 50 states. They conduct a difference-in-differences analysis using data from the FBI 
Uniform Crime Report (UCR). Their results provide little evidence that SYG laws deter 
burglary, robbery, or aggravated assault. Instead SYG laws appear to increase rates of 
murder and non-negligent manslaughters. Similarly, Ren, Zhang, and Zhao (2012) 
investigate whether the 2007 Joe Horn shooting deterred crime in Houston and Dallas, 
Texas.7 They conduct a time-series analysis using data on daily burglaries from each city’s 
7 On November 14, 2007 Joe Horn called 911 to report that he saw two burglars breaking into his neighbor’s 
home. In his conversation with an emergency dispatcher, Joe Horn referred to Texas’s recently enacted SYG 
law, and voiced his concern about letting the burglars get away. Armed with a shotgun, Joe Horn exited 
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police department. Their results tell a tale of two cities: in Houston, residential and 
business burglary rates dropped after the shooting, but in Dallas, no significant changes 
in burglary rates occurred. These results indicate the presence of a “place-conditioned” 
deterrent effect, given that the Joe Horn shooting occurred in vicinity of Houston. 
McClellan and Tekin (2012) focus on the effects of SYG laws on homicides and 
firearm injuries. They conduct a difference-in-differences analysis to discern how the 
passage of SYG laws affected rates of homicides and firearms injuries in each state.8 Their 
results indicate that SYG laws increased homicides of white males, but had no consistent 
effect on homicides of blacks. Furthermore, they analyze the causes behind the increase 
in homicides to determine whether the increase is driven by an increase in justifiable 
homicides (criminals killed by private citizens) or non-justifiable homicides (murder). 
They conclude that non-justifiable homicides are the driving factor behind the increase 
in homicides. This suggests that SYG laws do not lead to more justified killings of 
assailants. Lastly, they investigate the impact of SYG on firearm-related injuries. They 
conclude that SYG laws significantly increase the number of emergency room visits and 
hospital discharges related to firearm inflicted injuries. 
his home and confronted the burglars, despite being told by the emergency dispatcher to “not go outside 
the house.” Joe Horn then shot and killed the two burglars, claiming he had “no choice.” Subsequently, a 
Grand Jury cleared Joe Horn of all charges in June, 2008. 
8 Data on homicides comes from the U.S. Vital Statistics and the Supplemental Homicide Reports. Data on 
firearm injuries comes from the Health Care Utilization Project. 
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2.3 Explaining gun ownership 
Guns have two legitimate uses: protection and sport. Protection describes guns 
owned for self-defense, while sport encompasses a broader range of activities, like 
hunting, target shooting, and collecting. Cao, Cullen, and Link (1997) provide a 
foundation for my conceptual model of the demand for firearms. Their framework 
identifies six factors that offer explanations for why people choose to acquire firearms: 1) 
normal goods; 2) socialization; 3) personal experience; 4) collective security; 5) attitudes 
and beliefs; and 6) education. 
First, guns are normal goods. With more income, people can afford to purchase more 
firearms (Cao et al., 1997). While a low-cost market for firearms exists, (Mercy & 
Rosenberg, 1998; Smith, 1996; Wilkinson, McBryde, Williams, Bloom, & Bell, 2009), there 
is a positive relationship between income and firearm ownership (Glaeser & Glendon, 
1998; John R Lott, 2013; Luxenburg, Cullen, Langworthy, & Kopache, 1994). 
Second, socialization influences gun ownership through exposure to shared norms, 
values, and beliefs. According to Cao, “people possess firearms if they have been in social 
situations in which they have learned pro-gun values.” A number of studies find higher 
rates of gun ownership in the South and rural areas (Glaeser & Glendon, 1998; John R 
Lott, 2013), and these areas are generally thought to have strong gun cultures (Cao et al., 
1997). Similarly, having friends and peers who own guns also increases the likelihood of 
owning a gun (Cunningham, Henggeler, Limber, Melton, & Nation, 2000; Glaeser & 
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Glendon, 1998; Lizotte, Tesoriero, Thornberry, & Krohn, 1994). Lastly, socialization is 
thought to play a role in differences in gun ownership across gender, race, and age groups 
(Cao et al., 1997). Specifically, males, whites, and older persons are significantly more 
likely to own firearms (Edward L Glaeser, 1998).  
Third, personal experience plays a role in gun ownership. Cao et al. (1997) conclude 
that persons who are victims of crime are more likely to own guns for protection. Other 
studies find similar results (DeJong, 1997; Kleck & Kovandzic, 2009; Legault & Lizotte, 
2009; Lizotte & Bordua, 1980; Lizotte, Bordua, & White, 1981). However, other 
experiences, like serving in the military, do not significantly impact the likelihood of 
owning a firearm (Lizotte & Bordua, 1980; Lizotte et al., 1981). 
Fourth, collective security impacts gun ownership. People who live in safer areas are 
less likely to own guns. For example, a number of studies conclude that increases in law 
enforcement officers negatively correlate with gun ownership (Edward L Glaeser, 1998; 
Kleck & Kovandzic, 2009; Young, McDowall, & Loftin, 1987). Similarly, Cao et al. (1997) 
finds evidence that increases in informal collective security—the belief that neighbors 
will provide assistance against criminal victimization—reduces protective gun 
ownership. 
Fifth, political attitudes and beliefs also influence gun ownership. The political 
environment can have significant effects on the demand for firearms, as demonstrated by 
Depetris-Chauvin (2014). Chauvin studies the Obama effect and finds that the election of 
12 
 
President Obama led to a spike in the demand for firearms. Similarly, Kleck, Kovandzic, 
Saber, and Hauser (2011) find that people with conservative ideologies have higher rates 
of gun ownership. Likewise, people with less faith in public institutions, such as courts 
and the federal government, are more likely to own guns (Glaeser & Glendon, 1998; Jiobu 
& Curry, 2001). However, gun ownership does not appear linked to violent attitudes 
(Dixon & Lizotte, 1987; Kleck, 2005; O'Connor & Lizotte, 1978). 
Sixth, education impacts gun ownership. In general, schools do not promote violence 
or the use of weapons, so people with more education should be less likely to own guns 
(Cao et al., 1997). A number of studies find evidence that education negatively correlates 
with gun ownership (Glaeser & Glendon, 1998; Jiobu & Curry, 2001; Lizotte et al., 1981). 
2.4 The effect of SYG laws on the demand for firearms 
SYG laws lower the cost of using deadly force by decreasing the likelihood that a 
defender will face criminal or civil penalties for the use of deadly force, regardless of 
whether his actions are right or wrong. According to the law of demand, a decrease in 
cost generally leads to an increase in demand. As a result, SYG laws should lead to a 
greater demand for firearms, ceteris paribus.  
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3 Data 
3.1 Estimating the demand for firearms 
I estimate the demand for firearms using data from the FBI on the National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System (NICS). The NICS performs background checks on 
persons in all states that seek to purchase firearms from gun stores or other Federal 
Firearms Licensees (FFLs). 
Before purchasing a firearm from an FFL, a buyer must complete form 4473, “which 
is effectively an application to the federal government to buy a weapon” (Jeunesse, 2013). 
On this form the buyer certifies under penalty of perjury that he is purchasing the firearm 
for himself and not “acquiring the firearm(s) on behalf of another person.”9 In addition, 
the buyer also indicates that he is not prohibited from purchasing a firearm under federal 
law.10 After the buyer completes form 4473, the seller must contact the NICS Section to 
verify the buyer’s eligibility.11 The NICS Section searches for the buyer’s name in three 
databases.12 If a valid match turns up, the seller may not proceed with the transaction. In 
over 90% of cases, the NICS Section determines a buyer’s eligibility immediately (NICS, 
9 To view the rest of ATF Form 4473 see www.atf.gov/files/forms/download/atf-f-4473-1.pdf  
10 Categories of persons who are generally prohibited from purchasing or possessing firearms under federal 
law include: felons, illegal aliens, and persons with mental illnesses. 
11 In Point of Contact (POC) states, the seller contacts a designated state agency to conduct the background 
check, rather than the NICS Section. 
12 These databases are the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), which contains information on 
wanted persons and protection orders; the Interstate Identification Index (III), which contains criminal 
history records; and the NICS Index. The NICS Index contains information that may not be available in the 
NCIC or the III regarding persons predetermined to be prohibited from receiving firearms under federal 
or state law. 
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2012). In situations where more information is needed, the NICS Section can delay the 
sale for up to three business days.13 
The FBI publishes the number of monthly NICS background checks it has conducted 
in each state since December 1998.14 For this study, I use NICS data from January 2000 
through December 2012. To more easily compare background checks across states, I 
convert my data into a rate per 100,000 persons using annual population estimates from 
the Census Bureau. 
Compared to other measures of gun ownership, the NICS confers four key 
advantages. First, data on the NICS is available at the state and monthly levels.15 Second, 
the NICS is collected in close proximity to actual gun purchases. In contrast, surveys of 
gun ownership may be prone to measurement error, especially when they rely on self-
reports. Third, the NICS stems from individual-level decisions to purchase firearms.16 
Fourth, unlike measures of firearm mortality, the NICS is not an outcome of gun 
ownership. 
Despite its merits, the NICS is not a perfect measure of demand for firearms. First, 
data in the NICS only measures guns sold by licensed retailers in the primary market, 
13 If the FFL does not received a response from the NICS Section, the FFL may proceed with the firearms 
transfer. In cases where an FFL proceeds with the transaction, but later receives a deny decision after the 
lapse of three business days, the ATF is responsible for retrieving the firearm from the buyer. 
14 This data is available at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/. 
15 In contrast, a number of studies use data from the General Social Survey (GSS), which only provides 
regional and annual measures of gun ownership. 
16 In contrast, the GSS only provides a measure of gun ownership at the household level. 
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which omits firearms transfers that occur in the secondary markets.17 Firearms sales on 
the secondary market generally do not require background checks, such as purchases 
from individual attendees at gun shows.18 Philip Cook estimates that 40% of all firearms 
transactions occur on the secondary market, which means a significant portion of gun 
transfers may occur without background checks (Cook, Molliconi, & Cole, 1995).19 
Similarly, data on the NICS also does not consider illicit gun transfers that occur in 
underground firearm markets.  
3.2 Stand Your Ground 
My primary explanatory variable is the presence of a SYG law. I identified the 
effective date of SYG laws from state legislative websites. I created two indicator variables 
of SYG. My first variable indicates the presence of a full SYG law, and my second variable 
indicates the presence of a partial SYG law.20 I assigned an observation a value of one in 
a month and year where a state had a SYG law in effect, and a value of zero otherwise. If 
a state passed a SYG law on a day other than the first of the month, I coded the entire 
month as one.21  
17 The primary market for firearms refers to firearms sold by FFL’s. In contrast, the secondary market for 
firearms encompasses sales between private parties, such as individual sellers at gun shows (Cook, 1995). 
18 A number of states have exemptions to this rule, and require NICS background checks for all firearms 
transfers. A table of these states can be found in the appendix. 
19 Other studies of gun ownership have also found an approximately 60/40 split between the primary and 
secondary markets. 
20 My indicators of full and partial SYG states are mutually exclusive from one another. A state with a full 
SYG law is not also deemed a partial SYG state. 
21 In addition, I performed robustness checks by recoding SYG in these months as zero and the proportion 
of days SYG was in effect that month. My overall results remained unchanged. 
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3.3 Additional controls 
I include a number of controls in my analysis in order to account for other factors that 
influence the demand for firearms, as outlined in my conceptual model. Because the 
empirical literature shows that gun demand varies by race, age, and gender, I control for 
differences in state demographics using data from the Census Bureau. Specifically, I use 
annual population estimates of: gender (male and female); race (white, black, and other 
race); ethnicity (Hispanic and non-Hispanic); and age (<30, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60+). 
Similarly, to account for the impact of education on the demand for firearms, I control for 
differences in high school and college graduation rates across states, using data from the 
American Community Survey (ACS).22 
I include controls for personal income and unemployment to account for economic 
differences across states, which impact the demand for firearms. I obtain data on total 
quarterly personal income in each state from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data on 
seasonally adjusted unemployment comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
To control for differences in criminal victimization and collective security, I include 
data on state law enforcement and violent crime rates. Data on the number of law 
enforcement officers and violent crimes committed in each state and year comes from 
Crime in the United States.23,24  
22 The ACS is an annual survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that provides insight on changes in 
demographics in American communities. For more information see www.census.gov/acs.  
23 Crime in the United States is an annual publication by the FBI drawn from the Uniform Crime Report. 
24 Violent crime consists of murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. 
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Lastly, I control for political attitudes by including data on the political environment 
at the federal and state levels. At the federal level, I include an indicator variable of the 
election of President Obama. This accounts for the spike in NICS background checks that 
occurred following the election of President Obama, as discussed by Depetris-Chauvin 
(2014). I code the control for President Obama as one in months after his election 
(November 2008), and as zero in months prior. At the state level, I control for the political 
party of the governor, as well as the composition of the lower house of state legislature. 
This data comes from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research. Political 
party of governor is a binary variable, where one represents a Democratic governor, and 
zero otherwise. My control for state house corresponds to the fraction of Democrats 
elected to the lower house of a state’s legislature in a given year. Summary statistics for 
all of the control variables can be found in Table 3.  
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4 Empirical analysis 
I use three empirical approaches to compare the demand for firearms in states with 
SYG laws (the treated group) to states without SYG laws (the control group). Were I to 
only examine changes in the demand for firearms within the treated group, I would fail 
to account for other variables that influence the demand for firearms. To address this 
shortcoming I include a control group in my analysis. Demand in the control group serves 
as a proxy for demand in the treatment group absent the passage of a SYG law. I take 
advantage of variation in self-defense law across states and time and test for effects of 
SYG using three comparison sets:  
1) North Carolina and South Carolina (SYG); 
2) All states with and all states without SYG laws;  
3) All states with SYG laws and their respective synthetic control states. 
Each approach is discussed in detail below. 
4.1 North and South Carolina 
First I examine the impact of SYG in the Carolinas using a difference-in-differences 
approach. I use monthly data between December, 2004 and December, 2007. This time 
frame begins 18 months before South Carolina enacted its SYG law and extends 18 
months after its enactment. I use North Carolina as a counterfactual for two reasons. First, 
these two states have a similar demographic composition—see Table 4. Second, North 
and South Carolina have similar trends in NICS background checks during the pre-
treatment period—see Figure 2. 
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I represent the empirical model with the following equation:  D𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 =  α + β[SYG]𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + γ[SC]𝑠𝑠 + δ[SC × SYG]𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 + 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 + ε𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (1) 
where D𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the demand for firearms in a given state (s), month (m), and year (y). α is 
the constant. [SYG]𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the estimated coefficient times an indicator of the treatment 
period; [SC]𝑠𝑠 is a coefficient times an indicator of South Carolina. [SC × SYG]𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is a 
coefficient times an indicator of South Carolina during the treatment period. µ𝑠𝑠 are 
month fixed effects, and µ𝑠𝑠 are year fixed effects. Lastly, ε𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the error term. 
The main advantage of this approach is North Carolina’s resemblance to South 
Carolina, which makes a good estimate of the demand for firearms in South Carolina 
absent SYG. As a result, this approach controls for other factors that influence the demand 
for firearms— even those that are unobserved. However, this analysis comes from a small 
number of observations, which limits the statistical power. In addition, results may not 
generalize beyond the Carolinas, since they do not speak to the U.S. as a whole. My 
subsequent analysis minimizes these drawbacks. 
4.2 Statewide analysis 
Next I analyze the impact of SYG on monthly demand for firearms in 48 states 
between the years 2000 and 2012.25 I use a similar identification strategy as in my previous 
analysis. I compare demand for firearms between SYG and non-SYG states, before and 
25 I omit Kentucky because it conducts monthly background checks of all firearm permit holders, which 
greatly inflates its monthly NICS totals. I omit Utah because it has had a SYG law throughout the entire 
time frame of this analysis. 
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after the enactment of a SYG law. However, because not all states are similar this analysis 
requires controls for other factors that influence the demand for firearms in each state. I 
include these controls in order to distinguish the impact of SYG from other factors that 
influence the demand for firearms. I represent this model with the following equation:  D𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 =  α + β[SYG]𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + γ[X]𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + δ[Y]𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + ϑ[Z]𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 + 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 + 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 + ε𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (2) 
where D𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the demand for firearms in a given state (s), month (m), and year (y). α is 
the constant. [SYG]𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is an indicator of SYG. [X]𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is a vector of annual state-level control 
variables. [Y]𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is a vector of quarterly state-level control variables. [Z]𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is a vector of 
monthly state-level control variables. 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 are state fixed effects, µ𝑠𝑠 are month fixed effects, 
and µ𝑠𝑠 are year fixed effects. Lastly, ε𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the error term. 
The strengths and weaknesses of this approach are the opposite of those from the 
previous analysis. By using data on most states, these findings are generalizable to the 
US as a whole. In addition, data in this analysis contains a larger number of observations, 
which strengthens the statistical power of this analysis. However, this approach relies on 
a weaker counterfactual for SYG states. While I control for many variables that influence 
the demand for firearms, other confounding variables may be unaccounted for, thereby 
biasing my results. These shortcomings segue to my analysis of SYG using the synthetic 
control method. 
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4.3 Synthetic Control method 
I utilize the synthetic control method (SCM) to construct annual estimates of demand 
for firearms in artificial states that function as a control group. The SCM is a novel 
econometric approach that draws on the strengths of both of my previous approaches. 
The primary advantage of this method is that “it provides a better comparison for the 
unit exposed to the intervention than any single unit alone” (Abadie, Diamond, & 
Hainmueller, 2011). Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) introduced this method in their 
analysis of the economic consequences of terrorism in the Basque Country. This approach 
involves two steps. First, synthetic control units are created from a weighted average of 
all possible control units. Second, synthetic control units are compared to the treated units 
during the pre and post-treatment periods—similar to a traditional difference-in-
differences analysis. The authors describe the approach as follows: 
Synthetic control methods involve the construction of synthetic control units as 
convex combinations of multiple control units. The weights that define the 
synthetic control unit are chosen such that the synthetic control unit best 
approximates the relevant characteristics of the treated unit during the 
pretreatment period. The post-intervention outcomes for the synthetic control unit 
are then used to estimate the outcomes that would have been observed for the 
treated unit in the absence of the intervention (Abadie et al., 2011, p. 2). 
I apply the SCM to the 13 states that enacted SYG laws between 2005 and 2007.26 
However, I limit my analysis to 6 states: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Kansas, South 
26 I limit my analysis to this time frame in order to eliminate the “Obama effect” as discussed by Depetris-
Chauvin (2014). By doing so I am able to create synthetic control states that more closely resemble the real 
states during the pretreatment period. 
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Carolina, and Texas. This is because in these states, demand for fireams in the synthetic 
states closely resembled demand for firearms in the treated states during the pre-
treatment period. Once synthetic controls are constructed for each state, I compare the 
difference in demand for firearms in each state and its control state, before and after the 
passage of SYG laws. Because each synthetic control state is constructed to closely match 
a treatment state, comparison can be undertaken by regressing the difference in firearms 
demand on an indicator for SYG. I represent this application of the SCM using the 
following equation: D𝑠𝑠 =  α + β[SYG]𝑠𝑠 + ε𝑠𝑠 (3) 
Where D𝑠𝑠 represents the difference in the average demand for firearms between a treated 
state and its synthetic counterpart, α indicates the constant, and [SYG]𝑠𝑠 indicates the 
presence of a SYG law. ε𝑠𝑠 is the error term. 
To construct my synthetic control states, I first aggregated NICS data on demand for 
firearms to the annual level by averaging NICS across months in a year, in order to 
decrease noise in the dataset.27 Next, I constructed synthetic control states from a 
weighted average of demand for firearms in non-SYG states. To do so I used Synth, a 
STATA package created by Alberto Abadie, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller.28 
This program is based on the synthetic control method used in their previous papers. In 
27 This step mitigated the noise from monthly fluctuations in background checks due to permit. 
28 The Synth package is available at www.stanford.edu/~jhain/synthpage.html  
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Synth I inputted the predictors for the demand for firearms for each potential control 
state and year, to construct weights for each treated state’s synthetic control. Synth then 
returned: 1) the weights it used to construct each synthetic control state;29 and 2) a dataset 
with background checks in the real and synthetic states over the entire time frame.  
I then compared the demand between real and synthetic states before and after the 
passage of SYG laws. Lastly, I created an overall index of the impact of SYG across all of 
these states by taking the difference in the demand for firearms between each real and 
synthetic state, at each point in time.  
29 A table with the weights used to construct each synthetic control state can be found in Appendix A. 
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5 Results 
5.1 North and South Carolina 
Table 5 presents OLS estimates from my analysis of the Carolinas. The first row lists 
coefficients on the indicator of South Carolina during the treatment period. The 
subsequent rows list: 1) Coefficients on the indicator for South Carolina; 2) Coefficients 
on the indicator for the treatment period; and 3) the constants. The first three columns 
span a 37 month window—December, 2004 and December, 2007 (18 months before and 
after SYG). The next three columns span a shorter window—June 2005 through June 2007 
(12 months before and after SYG). In both cases, coefficients on the indicator of South 
Carolina during the treatment period are positive, but not statistically significant. In other 
words, the enactment of a SYG law in South Carolina appears to have resulted in 3.5 more 
NICS background checks per 100,000 persons in a given month, but the estimates are not 
precise enough to rule out that the effect is zero. The inclusion of time fixed effects did 
not alter these results. 
I performed a robustness check to determine whether including or omitting the first 
month of SYG would alter my results. I explored three coding schemes: 1) coding June, 
2006 as one; 2) coding June, 2006 as zero; and 3) coding June, 2006 as .3 (the fraction of 
days the SYG law was in effect that month). Table 6 provides coefficients on the indicator 
of SYG from these analyses, which remain largely unchanged. These results suggest that 
different coding schemes had little effect on my results. 
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5.2 Statewide analysis 
Table 7 presents OLS estimates of the impact of SYG law on NICS background checks 
from an analysis of the larger set of states. The first row provides coefficients on the 
indicator for SYG. Subsequent rows contain the following: coefficients for each of my 
control variables, the constant, whether time and state fixed effects are included, and the 
number of observations. Standard errors can be found below each coefficient in 
parenthesis. This analysis covers January 2000 through December 2012. The estimates in 
columns three and four omit Nebraska due to its unicameral legislature.30  
The coefficients on SYG are positive and statistically significant in all columns, but 
the magnitude decreases, as more controls are included. The enactment of a SYG law is 
associated with approximately 27 more background checks per 100,000 persons in a given 
month.  
Most coefficients on my controls are statistically significant, and have a sign that 
matches what I expected based on the conceptual model of demand for guns. With 
regards to coefficients for demographics, states that have a greater percentage of males, 
whites, non-Hispanics, and persons age 40-49 tend to have significantly more NICS 
background checks per capita. The coefficient controlling for the election of President 
Obama indicates that his election is associated with a significant increase in NICS 
30 Results do not significantly change when including Nebraska (and omitting the control for state 
legislature). 
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background checks. This is similar to findings by Chauvin (2014). This spike may reflect 
a response by gun owners to fears President Obama is “trying to take away Americans’ 
guns.”31 Interestingly, coefficients on the state-level political environment tell two 
different stories. States with Democratic governors have a higher demand for firearms, 
but states with Democratic legislatures have a lower demand for firearms. Coefficients 
on indicators of violent crime are positive and significant, which indicate that increased 
criminal victimization is associated with increases in the number of NICS background 
checks per capita. Similarly, most coefficients on law enforcement are negative and 
significant, which is consistent with the predicted effects of collective security in my 
conceptual model. An exception is the coefficient on law enforcement, which is negative 
when state and time fixed effects are included, and contrary to my conceptual model.  
In addition I test for differences in results when controlling for region or division, 
instead of state. Table 8 provides coefficients on SYG with alternate geographic controls. 
Coefficients on SYG remain positive and significant in all cases, which indicate that 
alternate geographic controls do not alter my results. 
Next I perform a robustness check to test the impact of alternate coding of SYG—
using the same coding variations I used in the robustness test of South Carolina.  
Table 9 presents the results of this analysis, which indicate that coding the first 
effective month of SYG as one, zero, or the fraction of days does not impact my results.  
31 See the following article for more information: www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/us/07guns.html  
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5.3 Synthetic Control Method 
First, I present results from an application of the SCM in Florida: comparing real and 
synthetic Florida. This approach is identical to the SCM I used for the remaining SYG 
states. Florida is a particularly interesting case because its passage of a SYG law in 2005 
foreshadowed a large number of states the enacted SYG laws in the succeeding years. 
Next I present results from an analysis of SYG overall: comparing differences between 
six of the real and synthetic states during years 2000 to 2008.  
Florida 
Figure 3 plots the demand for firearms in Florida and synthetic Florida. As exhibited 
by this figure, real and synthetic Florida exhibit similar trends in demand for firearms 
during the pre-treatment period, which indicates that synthetic Florida makes a strong 
counterfactual for real Florida in the absence of a SYG law. Following the passage of 
Florida’s SYG law (in 2005), real Florida abruptly begins to outpace synthetic Florida in 
terms of its demand for firearms. These results indicate that Florida’s SYG law led to a 
substantial increase in the demand for firearms. This is especially important, because 
Florida was one of the earliest states to enact a SYG law, and its SYG law generated much 
scrutiny in the wake of the shooting of Trayvon Martin. 
All states 
Figure 4 contains five graphs of demand for firearms between real and synthetic 
states for the other five treated states. As a whole, these plots resemble the trends found 
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in the previous figure between real and synthetic Florida. In most of these plots, demand 
for firearms in real and synthetic states trends similarly during the pretreatment period. 
Of these plots, real and synthetic Kansas bear closest resemblance during the 
pretreatment period, while real and synthetic Texas bear least resemblance during this 
period. However, following the enactment of SYG, demand for firearms in the real state 
begins to outpace demand in the synthetic one. Overall, these figures provide further 
evidence that the passage of SYG laws led to an increase in demand for firearms. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on SYG in a regression of the form of equation (3), of the 
difference between each of these six real and synthetic states over this time period (2000-
2008) returns a coefficient of 13.8—both positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This indicates that states that enacted a SYG law experienced 13.8 additional NICS 
background checks (per 100,000 population) each month, which is similar to the 
coefficient on SYG found in the previous analysis of 48 states.   
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6 Conclusions 
This study investigated whether the passage of SYG laws led to an increase in the 
demand for firearms by using three separate difference in differences analyses. Results 
indicate that the passage of SYG laws led to a significant increase in the demand for 
firearms. Using monthly data on NICS background checks, I show that the passage of a 
SYG law in South Carolina led to an increase in the demand for firearms—though results 
from this analysis were not statistically significant. Analysis of 48 states produced more 
conclusive findings. Estimates from an analysis of 48 states indicate that SYG laws led to 
a statistically significant increase in the demand for firearms. Findings from the SCM 
paint a similar picture—especially in Florida and Kansas. 
The implications of this study relate to the previous research on SYG laws, which 
have concluded that SYG laws lead to significantly more adverse firearm-related 
outcomes—e.g., homicides and injuries (Cheng & Hoekstra, 2012; McClellan & Tekin, 
2012). This study may explain part of those findings. A greater demand for firearms 
might translate into greater gun ownership. As a consequence of greater gun ownership, 
more people may be at risk of accidental gun related injuries, or of being the victim of a 
homicide. 
Of course, as with any research, this study has some limitations. It does not account 
for differences in firearms legislation across states (e.g., shall-issue permit laws). Such 
differences in state firearms legislation may, in part, explain some of the variation in the 
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demand for firearms over this period. Future research is also needed on the effects of 
different types of SYG laws. Do outcomes differ between full, partial, and case law SYG 
states? Do outcomes differ in states with SYG established via legal precedent rather than 
by legislation? These will add to a better understanding of the demand for firearms, and 
can help better inform firearm-related policy making.
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Table 1: States with full Stand Your Ground laws 
State Date Source 
Alabama 6/1/2006 Ala. Code § 13A-3-23 
Alaska 9/18/2013 Alaska Stat. § 11.81.335 
Arizona 4/24/2006 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-411 
Florida 10/1/2005 Fla. Stat. § 776.013 
Georgia 7/1/2006 Ga. Code. § 16-3-23.1 
Indiana 7/1/2006 Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2 
Kansas 7/1/2006 Kan. Stat. § 21-5230 
Kentucky 7/12/2006 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.055 
Louisiana 8/15/2006 La. Rev. Stat. § 14:20 
Michigan 10/1/2006 Mich. Comp. Laws § 780.972 
Mississippi 7/1/2006 Miss. Code § 97-3-15 
Montana 4/27/2009 Mont. Code § 45-3-110 
Nevada 10/1/2011 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.120 
New Hampshire 11/13/2011 N.H. Rev. Stat. § 627:4 
North Carolina 12/1/2011 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3 
Oklahoma 11/1/2011 21 Okla. Stat. § 1289.25 
Pennsylvania 8/27/2011 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 505 
South Carolina 6/9/2006 S.C. Code § 16-11-440 
South Dakota 2/17/2006 SDCL § 22-18-4 
Tennessee 5/22/2007 Tenn. Code 39-11-611 
Texas 9/1/2007 Tex. Penal Code § 9.31 
Utah 3/2/1994 Utah Code § 76-2-402 
West Virginia 2/28/2008 W. Va. Code § 55-7-22 
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Table 2: States with partial Stand Your Ground laws 
State Year Source 
Alaska 2006 Alaska Stat. § 11.81.335 
Connecticut 1992 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-19 
Delaware 1995 Del. Code tit. 11, § 4-465 
Hawaii 2001 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 703-304 
Iowa 1997 Iowa Code § 704.1 
Louisiana 1997 La. Rev. Stat. § 14:20 
Missouri 2007 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031 
Nebraska 1975 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409 
North Dakota 2007 N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-07 
Ohio 2008 Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.09 
Oklahoma 2006 21 Okla. Stat. § 1289.25 
Wisconsin 2011 Wis. Stat. § 939.48 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of controls 
  Mean SD 
Male 0.49 0.01 
Black  0.10 0.10 
Other race 0.08 0.10 
Non-Hispanic 0.90 0.10 
Age <30 0.41 0.03 
Age 30-39 0.13 0.01 
Age 50-59 0.13 0.01 
Age 60+ 0.18 0.02 
Bachelor degree or higher 0.26 0.05 
High school degree or higher 0.86 0.04 
Obama elected 0.32 0.47 
Governor (Democrat) 0.47 0.50 
State House (% Democrat) 0.52 0.16 
Law enforcement (per 1,000) 3.07 0.62 
Violent Crime (per 100,000) 394 170 
Unemployment (%) 5.83 2.15 
Personal income  35.87 6.89 
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Table 4: Demographic comparison between North and South Carolina 
  North Carolina South Carolina 
Population total 8,856,505 4,321,249 
Land area (square miles) 48,617 30,060 
Persons per square mile 182 144 
   
White 71.4% 68.5% 
Black 22.1% 29.4% 
American Indian And Alaska Native 1.7% 0.7% 
Asian 2.1% 1.3% 
Other Race 4.1% 1.4% 
   
Hispanic 6.7% 3.4% 
Not Hispanic 93.3% 96.6% 
   
Male 49.0% 48.7% 
Female 51.0% 51.3% 
   
Under 20 years 27.2% 27.2% 
20 to 34 years 20.3% 19.8% 
35 to 54 years 29.3% 28.7% 
55 to 74 years 17.5% 18.6% 
75 years and over 5.6% 5.8% 
   
High school degree or higher1 82.0% 81.3% 
Bachelor's degree or higher1 24.8% 22.7% 
   
Median household income $42,625 $41,100 
Mean household income $57,184 $55,128 
   
Unemployment 6.6% 7.4% 
   
Percent below poverty level2 14.7% 15.7% 
      
Source: 2006 American Community Survey 
   
Notes: 
1 Population over 25 
2 Percent of families and persons (in the past 12 months) 
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Table 5: OLS estimates of SYG on background checks in South Carolina 
  
 NICS (37 months)  NICS (25 months) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
S. Carolina Post 3.5 3.5 3.5  5.6 5.6 5.6 
(38.8) (6.0) (7.0)  (36.3) (6.0) (6.8) 
S. Carolina 13.9 13.9*** 13.9***  10.8 10.8** 10.8** 
 (28.9) (4.9) (4.9)  (29.0) (4.4) (4.3) 
Post 2.4 1.6 -8.1  -7.7 -2.1 -10.1 
 (27.5) (5.1) (6.4)  (28.6) (4.5) (8.7) 
Constant 268.6*** 269.1*** 251.6***  270.7*** 283.3*** 275.0*** 
  (21.4) (9.4) (19.8)  (21.9) (7.3) (9.2) 
Month effects No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Year effects No No Yes  No No Yes 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: FBI NICS (December 2004 - December 2007) 
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Table 6: Robustness check on indicator of SYG in South Carolina 
   NICS (37 months)  NICS (25 months) 
All of June  3.477 3.477 3.477  5.582 5.582 5.582 
 (35.80) (6.360) (5.614)  (36.26) (5.984) (6.750) 
Fraction of June -5.689 4.730 3.828  -7.281 7.218 6.342 
 (29.93) (6.176) (6.573)  (43.95) (7.179) (6.176) 
None of June -8.395 5.224 3.600  -11.29 7.596 5.516 
 (38.68) (6.210) (6.262)  (45.16) (4.634) (4.052) 
Month effects No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Year effects No No Yes  No No Yes 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: FBI NICS (December 2004 - December 2007) 
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Table 7: OLS estimates of SYG on NICS background checks in all states 
  NICS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stand your ground 134.3*** 68.59*** 41.99*** 27.48*** 
[6.551] [6.479] [5.064] [4.657] 
Male   15309.3*** 5434.5*** 
  [511.9] [1878.9] 
Black   -162.0*** -664.7 
  [34.43] [443.0] 
Other race   -615.1*** 2923.9*** 
  [17.89] [453.1] 
Non-Hispanic   596.4*** 1618.6*** 
  [28.57] [375.5] 
Age <30   3061.2*** 6022.1*** 
  [311.2] [848.2] 
Age 30-39   -2416.0*** 3352.5*** 
  [407.9] [462.4] 
Age 50-59   7672.2*** 3534.8*** 
  [526.3] [647.4] 
Age 60+   1726.8*** 3805.0*** 
  [296.7] [553.7] 
College   456.2*** -400.2** 
  [74.23] [198.1] 
High school   -1914.0*** -212.7 
  [104.5] [183.4] 
Obama   99.20*** 85.64*** 
  [14.34] [10.31] 
Governor   18.73*** 2.398 
  [3.061] [2.652] 
State House   -28.72* -121.1*** 
  [14.83] [22.04] 
Law enforcement   -13.33*** 19.76*** 
  [3.155] [5.807] 
Violent Crime   0.0713*** 0.0878*** 
  [0.0125] [0.0314] 
Unemployment   -15.36*** -3.949** 
  [1.321] [1.552] 
Personal income   -3.515*** 0.197 
  [0.523] [1.098] 
Constant 336.7*** 262.7*** -8174.9*** -8428.5*** 
[2.603] [10.45] [335.1] [896.4] 
Month and year No Yes Yes Yes 
State No No No Yes 
Observations 7488 7488 7320 7320 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Standard errors in brackets 
Source: NICS (January 2000 - December 2012)   
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Table 8: OLS coefficients of SYG on NICS background checks by geographic unit 
  NICS 
  State Division Region 
Stand your ground 27.48*** 44.09*** 47.94*** 
[4.657] [4.888] [4.996] 
Male 5434.5*** 10714.6*** 10736.4*** 
[1878.9] [592.6] [587.5] 
Black -664.7 -408.1*** -383.4*** 
[443.0] [40.53] [38.71] 
Other race 2923.9*** -538.3*** -663.6*** 
[453.1] [21.85] [18.01] 
Non-Hispanic 1618.6*** 760.9*** 720.3*** 
[375.5] [32.51] [31.70] 
Age <30 6022.1*** 1034.9*** 2357.5*** 
[848.2] [341.7] [339.3] 
Age 30-39 3352.5*** -3078.6*** -3751.3*** 
[462.4] [418.6] [423.9] 
Age 50-59 3534.8*** 6259.6*** 5829.9*** 
[647.4] [548.3] [557.6] 
Age 60+ 3805.0*** 156.3 646.1** 
[553.7] [312.8] [315.0] 
College -400.2** 580.5*** 194.3** 
[198.1] [79.30] [75.98] 
High school -212.7 -2016.4*** -1749.9*** 
[183.4] [123.5] [122.5] 
Obama 85.64*** 93.41*** 102.8*** 
[10.31] [13.67] [14.14] 
Governor 2.398 11.93*** 10.66*** 
[2.652] [3.070] [3.096] 
State House -121.1*** -89.05*** -23.54 
[22.04] [16.01] [14.79] 
Law enforcement 19.76*** -40.66*** -9.677*** 
[5.807] [3.388] [3.127] 
Violent Crime 0.0878*** 0.0761*** 0.0445*** 
[0.0314] [0.0126] [0.0129] 
Unemployment -3.949** -8.309*** -15.85*** 
[1.552] [1.560] [1.462] 
Personal income 0.197 1.608*** -0.222 
[1.098] [0.581] [0.569] 
Constant -8428.5*** -4720.4*** -5330.3*** 
[896.4] [410.6] [409.8] 
Month and year Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7320 7320 7320 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Standard errors in brackets 
Source: NICS (January 2000 - December 2012)  
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Table 9: Robustness check on indicator of SYG in all states 
  NICS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
All of month 134.3*** 68.59*** 41.99*** 27.48*** 
 [6.551] [6.479] [5.064] [4.657] 
Fraction of month 138.9*** 64.16*** 45.12*** 22.27*** 
 [7.446] [7.287] [5.544] [5.234] 
None of month 135.3*** 68.53*** 42.60*** 28.21*** 
  [6.596] [6.528] [5.089] [4.672] 
Month and year No Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous controls No No Yes Yes 
State No No No Yes 
Observations         
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Standard errors in brackets 
Source: NICS (January 2000 - December 2012)   
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Figure 1: States with full SYG laws by year 
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Figure 2: NICS background checks (per capita) in North Carolina and South Carolina 
 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Dec 2004 Jun 2005 Dec 2005 Jun 2006 Dec 2006 Jun 2007 Dec 2007
South Carolina 
enacts SYG law
48 
 
Figure 3: Graph of NICS per capita for Florida and Synthetic Florida 
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Figure 4: Graphs of NICS per capita for real and synthetic control states 
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Appendix A 
 Synthetic Control Weights 
Alabama   Kansas  
State Weight  State Weight 
Alaska 0.020  Iowa 0.171 
Arkansas 0.120  Idaho 0.390 
Missouri 0.160  Illinois 0.130 
North Carolina 0.100  Nebraska 0.039 
North Dakota 0.040  New Jersey 0.234 
Oklahoma 0.400  Washington 0.036 
West Virginia 0.170    
     
Arizona   South Carolina 
State Weight  State Weight 
California 0.002  Maryland 0.431 
Iowa 0.001  North Carolina 0.167 
North Dakota 0.111  New Mexico 0.371 
New Jersey 0.024  West Virginia 0.031 
New Mexico 0.202    
Nevada 0.478    
New York 0.100    
Rhode Island 0.083  Texas  
   State Weight 
Florida   Idaho 0.416 
State Weight  Illinois 0.071 
Maine 0.307  Maryland 0.08 
New York 0.693  New York 0.433 
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